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Value:	  A	  Menu	  of	  Ques/ons
Joseph	  Raz
For	  a	  long	  )me	  John	  Finnis	  and	  I	  taught	  a	  joint	  seminar	  every	  year.	  Many	  students	  were	  lured	  
to	  a:end	  expec)ng	  to	  witness	  fierce	  intellectual	  conflicts	  between	  two	  academics	  known	  to	  
adhere	  to	  diametrically	  opposed	  philosophical	  tradi)ons.	  I	  would	  like	  to	  think	  that	  their	  
disappointment	  at	  the	  general	  absence	  of	  the	  expected	  clashes	  was	  compensated	  for	  by	  an	  
example	  of	  produc)ve	  debate	  among	  people	  with	  diverse	  opinions.	  But	  that	  is	  too	  self-­‐
congratulatory	  a	  view.	  Perhaps	  closer	  to	  the	  truth	  is	  that	  while	  we	  tend	  to	  have	  radically	  
different	  views	  on	  many	  specific	  moral	  and	  poli)cal	  issues	  we	  share	  a	  general	  approach	  to	  the	  
understanding	  of	  theore)cal	  ethics	  and	  prac)cal	  reason.	  One	  way	  of	  characterizing	  the	  
approach	  is	  as	  a	  value-­‐based	  account	  of	  prac)cal	  reasons.	  Finnis	  was	  happy	  to	  write	  about	  
values	  in	  NLNR,	  but	  in	  much	  later	  wri)ng	  used	  ‘goods’	  or	  ‘intelligible	  goods’	  or	  ‘human	  goods’	  
instead.	  As	  he	  does	  not	  suggest	  that	  the	  difference	  in	  terminology	  resulted	  from	  a	  difference	  in	  
content	  I	  will	  use	  both	  ‘value’	  and	  ‘goods’.	  I	  take	  this	  opportunity	  to	  reflect	  on	  some	  of	  the	  
issues	  that	  the	  value-­‐based	  approach	  raises.	  This	  is	  a	  preliminary	  inquiry,	  ending	  with	  
unanswered	  ques)ons.	  My	  hope	  is	  that	  there	  is	  some	  point	  in	  ar)cula)ng	  the	  ques)ons,	  and	  
some	  of	  their	  presupposi)ons.
1. Value	  and	  Ac/on	  for	  a	  reason
Fundamental	  to	  the	  value	  approach	  to	  prac)cal	  reason	  is	  the	  view	  that	  some	  ac)ons,	  ac)vi)es	  
or	  omissions	  (for	  brevity’s	  sake	  I	  will	  use	  ‘ac)ons’	  to	  refer	  to	  all	  these	  categories)	  have	  some	  
value	  proper)es,	  some	  good-	  or	  bad-	  making	  proper)es,	  and	  that	  those	  proper)es	  cons)tute	  
reasons	  for	  or	  against	  the	  ac)ons.	  The	  reasons	  referred	  to	  here	  are	  norma)ve	  reasons,	  
considera)ons	  that	  give	  a	  point	  to	  the	  ac)ons	  for	  which	  they	  are	  reasons,	  make	  them	  
desirable,	  and	  so	  on.	  There	  is	  no	  non-­‐circular	  explana)on	  of	  what	  norma)ve	  reasons	  are.	  The	  
no)on	  is	  explained	  contextually,	  and	  most	  helpfully	  by	  contrast	  with	  the	  other	  concept	  the	  
word	  ‘reasons’	  is	  used	  to	  express,	  namely	  reasons	  as	  the	  factors	  that	  explain	  what	  the	  reasons	  
are	  reasons	  for,	  as	  when	  we	  explain	  that	  the	  reason	  I	  lost	  the	  100m	  race	  is	  that	  I	  had	  a	  
stomach	  bug.	  Whenever	  I	  refer	  to	  (norma)ve)	  reasons	  I	  will	  be	  referring	  to	  pro	  tanto	  reasons.	  
As	  Finnis	  explains,	  values	  provide	  pro	  tanto	  reasons	  (NLNR	  62).	  I	  will	  not	  be	  concerned	  here	  
with	  the	  converse	  claim	  that	  nothing	  else	  provides	  reasons	  for	  ac)on.	  Ac)ons	  are	  not	  the	  only	  
bearers	  of	  value	  proper)es.	  Moreover,	  oYen	  they	  have	  value	  proper)es	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  
rela)ons	  with	  something	  else	  which	  has	  such	  proper)es:	  they	  may	  be	  cons)tuent	  elements	  of	  
more	  complex	  phenomena	  that	  are	  good,	  and	  therefore	  good	  in	  being	  component	  elements	  of	  
more	  complex	  goods,	  or	  they	  may	  facilitate	  the	  produc)on	  of	  some	  other	  goods,	  by	  crea)ng	  
opportuni)es	  for	  their	  produc)on,	  crea)ng	  favourable	  condi)ons	  for	  their	  produc)on,	  or	  simply	  
causing	  them.	  More	  indirectly	  they	  may	  be	  good	  because	  they	  have	  one	  of	  these	  rela)ons	  to	  
things	  or	  events	  that	  are	  good	  because	  they	  themselves	  bear	  these	  rela)ons	  to	  other	  goods.	  
Hence	  Finnis	  explains:	  ‘What	  “gives	  a	  reason”	  is	  the	  good	  that	  is	  referred	  to	  in	  spelling	  out	  the	  
reason’	  (NLNR	  443).	  
This	  last	  formula)on	  (clarified	  in	  the	  wider	  context	  to	  have	  the	  meaning	  I	  spell	  out	  below)	  and	  
some	  others	  require	  cau)ous	  treatment.	  For	  example,	  Finnis	  writes	  that	  ‘to	  say	  that	  such	  
knowledge	  is	  a	  value	  is	  simply	  to	  say	  that	  reference	  to	  the	  pursuit	  of	  knowledge	  makes	  
intelligible	  (though	  not	  necessarily	  reasonable-­‐all-­‐things-­‐considered)	  any	  par)cular	  instance	  of	  
the	  human	  ac)vity	  and	  commitment	  involved	  in	  such	  pursuit’.	  (62)	  Two	  caveats	  are	  needed	  for	  
a	  proper	  understanding	  of	  these	  two	  quota)ons.	  I	  believe	  that	  both	  caveats	  merely	  bring	  out	  
Finnis’s	  meaning.	  
To	  see	  the	  need	  for	  these	  caveats	  a	  crucial	  point	  about	  the	  rela)ons	  of	  reasons	  to	  values	  has	  to	  
be	  born	  in	  mind.	  In	  their	  ac)ons	  people	  and	  other	  living	  beings	  can	  be	  a:racted	  to	  good	  
op)ons	  without	  recognising	  their	  value.	  They	  may,	  for	  example,	  seek	  warmth,	  shelter,	  
protec)on	  from	  predators,	  food	  and	  water,	  both	  for	  themselves	  and	  for	  others,	  because	  they	  
are,	  as	  we	  might	  say,	  “hard	  wired”	  to	  do	  so.	  This	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  behaviour	  of	  living	  beings	  
that	  are	  incapable	  of	  ra)onal	  ac)on,	  incapable	  of	  realising	  the	  grounds	  for	  their	  choices.	  But	  it	  
is	  also	  true,	  though	  in	  a	  more	  limited	  way,	  of	  humans.	  Some)mes	  they	  too	  flinch	  from	  fire	  
ins)nc)vely,	  and	  not	  only	  through	  apprehension	  of	  the	  harm	  it	  may	  cause.	  They	  turn	  their	  head	  
automa)cally	  when	  hearing	  a	  loud	  or	  sudden	  noise,	  and	  while	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  of	  
prudence	  to	  do	  so,	  that	  is	  not	  why	  people	  do	  it.	  These	  ac)ons	  are	  a	  gene)cally	  determined	  
behaviour	  pa:ern.	  
Their	  ability	  to	  act	  because	  they	  perceive	  the	  value	  of	  the	  ac)on	  is	  dis)nc)ve	  of	  ra)onal	  beings	  
with	  a	  fully	  developed	  ability	  to	  act	  for	  reasons	  (I	  formulate	  it	  this	  way	  to	  allow	  that	  some	  
humans	  and	  some	  animals	  of	  other	  species	  have	  a	  more	  limited	  capacity	  to	  act	  for	  reasons).	  
Ac)ons	  that	  manifest	  that	  capacity	  do	  not	  necessarily	  have	  any	  value	  at	  all.	  But	  they	  are	  
ac)ons	  taken	  because	  the	  agents	  believed	  that	  they	  have	  some	  value.	  That	  is,	  I	  believe,	  the	  
intended	  meaning	  of	  Finnis’s	  observa)on	  that	  ac)ons	  are	  made	  intelligible	  by	  being	  ‘involved	  
in	  such	  pursuit’.
Needless	  to	  say,	  given	  that	  people’s	  beliefs	  in	  the	  value	  of	  their	  ac)ons	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  
exercise	  of	  their	  capacity	  for	  ra)onal	  ac)on	  the	  possibility	  that	  their	  ac)on	  possesses	  no	  value	  
is	  inescapable.	  It	  follows	  from	  the	  possibility	  that	  those	  beliefs	  are	  false.	  People	  act	  for	  a	  
reason	  whenever	  they	  act	  in	  the	  belief	  that	  their	  ac)ons	  have	  some	  value,	  whether	  these	  
beliefs	  are	  true	  or	  false,	  at	  least	  so	  long	  as	  their	  beliefs	  that	  their	  ac)ons	  have	  value	  are	  
intelligible.	  
Possibly	  this	  last	  qualifica)on	  is	  not	  needed.	  All	  that	  needs	  saying	  is	  that	  people	  act	  for	  a	  
reason	  when	  they	  act	  because	  they	  believe	  that	  the	  ac)on	  has	  some	  value.	  Of	  course	  there	  will	  
be	  cases	  in	  which	  people	  will	  claim	  that	  the	  reason	  for	  their	  ac)on	  was	  this	  or	  that,	  using	  
words	  we	  normally	  use	  to	  designate	  some	  evalua)ve	  property,	  but	  where	  in	  fact	  they	  do	  not	  
refer	  to	  any	  value	  property.	  Their	  command	  of	  the	  relevant	  words	  may	  be	  defec)ve,	  leading	  
them	  to	  choose	  the	  wrong	  word.	  Or	  their	  mastery	  of	  the	  concepts	  (either	  the	  concept	  of	  value,	  
or	  that	  of	  the	  specific	  evalua)ve	  property	  concerned)	  may	  be	  defec)ve	  and	  incoherent	  so	  that	  it	  
makes	  no	  sense	  to	  a:ribute	  to	  them	  the	  asser)on	  that	  would	  normally	  be	  expressed	  with	  the	  
words	  they	  used.	  The	  crucial	  point	  is	  that	  people	  may	  have	  false	  beliefs	  about	  what	  is	  of	  value.
I	  assume	  that	  the	  possibility	  that	  people	  may	  (and	  some)mes	  do)	  have	  false	  beliefs	  about	  the	  
value	  of	  various	  op)ons	  needs	  no	  argument.	  But	  are	  such	  beliefs	  intelligible?	  	  Perhaps	  they	  are	  
intelligible	  only	  when	  true,	  for	  they	  are	  made	  intelligible	  by	  it	  being	  the	  case	  that	  things	  are	  as	  
they	  represent	  them	  to	  be?	  That	  is	  a	  mistake.	  We	  do	  understand	  what	  people	  say	  even	  when	  
we	  do	  not	  know	  whether	  what	  they	  say	  is	  true.	  Moreover,	  we	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  know	  
whether	  what	  they	  say	  is	  true	  unless	  we	  know	  what	  they	  say,	  and	  if	  we	  can	  know	  what	  they	  
say	  independently	  of	  knowing	  whether	  it	  is	  true,	  we	  can	  also	  understand	  what	  they	  say	  
independently	  of	  knowing	  whether	  it	  is	  true.	  That	  is	  why	  expressions	  of	  false	  beliefs	  (to	  be	  
dis)nguished	  from	  the	  unintelligible	  use	  of	  words	  which	  cannot	  be	  understood	  as	  asser)ons	  of	  
beliefs)	  are	  intelligible.	  And	  that	  is	  why	  ac)ons	  for	  false	  beliefs	  about	  what	  is	  of	  value	  too	  are	  
intelligible.
We	  should	  therefore	  be	  careful	  in	  understanding	  what	  Finnis	  is	  saying	  when	  he	  writes	  that	  ‘to	  
say	  that	  such	  knowledge	  is	  a	  value	  is	  simply	  to	  say	  that	  reference	  to	  the	  pursuit	  of	  knowledge	  
makes	  intelligible	  (though	  not	  necessarily	  reasonable-­‐all-­‐things-­‐considered)	  any	  par)cular	  
instance	  of	  the	  human	  ac)vity	  and	  commitment	  involved	  in	  such	  pursuit’.	  (62)	  Ac)ng	  in	  pursuit	  
of	  value	  makes	  the	  ac)on	  intelligible.	  But	  so	  does	  (and	  Finnis	  does	  not	  deny	  this)	  ac)on	  in	  the	  
false	  belief	  that	  what	  it	  pursues	  is	  valuable.	  So,	  assuming	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  argument	  that	  
knowledge	  is	  not	  of	  value,	  people’s	  ac)ons	  in	  pursuit	  of	  knowledge	  may	  nonetheless	  be	  
intelligible,	  for	  example	  if	  they	  pursue	  knowledge	  in	  the	  mistaken	  belief	  that	  it	  is	  valuable.	  In	  
other	  words,	  we	  cannot	  infer	  the	  value	  of	  knowledge	  from	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  its	  pursuit.	  And	  
the	  same	  goes	  for	  other	  beliefs	  in	  the	  value	  of	  this	  or	  that.
2. The	  difficulty	  of	  harmony
With	  these	  clarifica)ons	  behind	  us	  I	  want	  to	  examine	  some	  ques)ons	  about	  value,	  focussing	  
on	  knowledge.	  I	  choose	  knowledge	  not	  only	  because	  it	  is	  Finnis’s	  chosen	  central	  example,	  and	  
not	  only	  because	  I	  have	  an	  independent	  interest	  in	  the	  ques)on	  whether	  there	  is	  value	  to	  
knowledge.	  It	  is	  also	  easier	  to	  examine	  than	  Finnis’s	  other	  examples	  of	  basic	  values.	  So	  before	  
looking	  at	  knowledge	  let	  me	  explain	  why	  it	  is	  a	  rela)vely	  easy	  case	  to	  consider.	  
Finnis’s	  original	  list	  of	  basic	  values	  consisted,	  apart	  from	  knowledge,	  of	  life,	  play,	  aesthe)c	  
experience,	  friendship,	  prac)cal	  reasonableness	  and	  religion.	  We	  were	  assured	  that	  other	  
supposed	  basic	  goods	  are	  but	  ‘ways	  or	  combina)ons	  of	  ways	  of	  pursuing	  (not	  always	  sensibly)	  
and	  realising	  (not	  always	  successfully)	  one	  of	  the	  seven	  basic	  forms	  of	  good,	  or	  some	  
combina)on	  of	  them’	  (NLNR	  90).	  On	  its	  face	  at	  least	  some	  aspects	  of	  the	  list	  are	  surprising.	  
For	  example	  some	  friendships	  and	  some	  religions	  or	  aesthe)c	  experiences	  are	  without	  merit	  
at	  all.	  Good	  friendships	  are	  good,	  and	  good	  religious	  experiences	  or	  lives,	  are	  good,	  but	  not	  all	  
friendships	  nor	  all	  religious	  experiences	  or	  religious	  lives,	  one	  is	  inclined	  to	  say,	  derive	  any	  
value	  from	  being	  friendships	  or	  from	  being	  religious.	  
It	  is	  clear,	  however,	  that	  when	  invoking	  friendship	  and	  religion	  Finnis	  intended	  to	  invoke	  only	  
those	  of	  their	  manifesta)ons	  that	  are	  good.	  He	  explains	  them	  in	  terms	  of	  harmony	  between	  
people	  (friendship)	  and	  between	  people	  and	  the	  divine	  (religion).	  That	  explains	  what,	  in	  
Finnis’s	  view,	  is	  the	  good	  of	  those	  forms	  of	  good,	  and	  the	  explana)on	  is	  open	  to	  ques)on.	  
Harmony	  came	  to	  assume	  greater	  prominence	  in	  Finnis’s	  later	  lis)ngs	  of	  basic	  goods.	  At	  )mes	  
one	  almost	  gets	  the	  impression	  that	  he	  thinks	  that	  there	  is	  only	  one	  value:	  harmony,	  and	  the	  
different	  values	  are	  merely	  harmony	  between	  different	  elements	  of	  the	  world.	  My	  comments	  
about	  the	  difficulty	  with	  harmony	  below	  will	  explain	  both	  the	  appearance	  of	  reduc)on	  to	  one	  
value	  (harmony)	  and	  why	  it	  is	  misleading.	  
The	  ques)on	  that	  troubles	  me	  is	  whether	  the	  proposi)on	  ‘harmony	  is	  intrinsically,	  i.e.	  non-­‐
instrumentally,	  good’	  is	  a	  conceptual	  truth	  or	  not.	  If	  not,	  then	  in	  the	  current	  jargon	  it	  is,	  if	  true	  
at	  all,	  a	  metaphysical	  truth.	  I	  doubt	  that	  it	  is	  a	  conceptual	  truth.	  Nor	  does	  Finnis	  take	  it	  to	  be	  
one.	  Finnis	  defends	  the	  claim	  that	  knowledge,	  friendship	  and	  the	  things	  which	  cons)tute	  the	  
other	  basic	  values	  are	  good	  by	  arguing	  that	  it	  is	  self-­‐evident	  that	  they	  are.	  Conceptual	  truths	  
may	  be	  self-­‐evident	  truths,	  but	  I	  doubt	  that	  Finnis’s	  defence	  of	  self-­‐evidence	  is	  meant	  to	  
vindicate	  reliance	  on	  it	  in	  coming	  to	  realise	  conceptual	  truths.
But	  if	  not	  a	  conceptual	  truth	  I	  doubt	  that	  ‘Harmony	  is	  a	  non-­‐instrumental	  good’	  is	  true	  at	  all.	  Of	  
course,	  some)mes	  it	  is	  good.	  But	  if	  it	  is	  only	  some)mes	  good	  then	  it	  is	  not	  harmony	  by	  itself	  
that	  is	  good,	  but	  only	  harmony	  combined	  with	  (or	  in	  the	  context	  of)	  something	  else.	  There	  is	  
something	  else	  that	  is	  making	  it	  good,	  or	  it	  is	  good	  only	  when	  combined	  with	  that	  something	  
else.	  Think	  of	  harmony	  as	  a	  property	  of	  a	  tune,	  or	  a	  pain)ng.	  It	  need	  not	  make	  the	  tune	  good.	  It	  
may	  make	  it	  boring.	  
Perhaps	  there	  are	  at	  least	  two	  concepts	  of	  harmony	  one	  rela)vely	  formal	  and	  the	  others	  
rela)vely	  substan)ve	  (I	  am	  using	  these	  terms	  in	  a	  non-­‐technical	  way).	  The	  formal	  concept	  of	  
harmony	  has	  it	  that	  anything	  is	  harmonious	  if	  it	  comprises	  parts	  or	  components	  that	  are	  
arranged,	  or	  that	  func)on,	  as	  they	  should	  be	  (or	  combined	  so	  as	  to	  produce	  a	  good	  effect),	  and	  
any	  number	  of	  items	  are	  harmonious	  if	  they	  are	  arranged	  or	  func)on	  as	  they	  should	  be	  or	  in	  
ways	  that	  will	  produce	  a	  good	  effect.	  The	  substan)ve	  no)ons	  specify	  certain	  rela)ons	  among	  
the	  elements	  of	  an	  object	  such	  that	  it	  is	  (formally)	  harmonious	  if	  they	  obtain.	  
The	  problem	  is	  that	  saying,	  e.g.	  that	  friendship	  is	  good	  because	  it	  is	  a	  (formally)	  harmonious	  
rela)onship	  is	  empty	  for	  it	  amounts	  to	  saying	  that	  friendship	  is	  good	  because	  it	  is	  a	  
rela)onship	  that	  is	  as	  it	  should	  be.	  But	  saying	  that	  friendship	  is	  good	  because	  it	  is	  a	  
(substan)vely)	  harmonious	  rela)onship	  is	  not,	  in	  the	  context	  in	  which	  the	  statements	  are	  
made	  by	  Finnis,	  much	  more	  help.	  It	  is	  doubful	  that	  there	  is	  only	  one	  substan)ve	  rela)onship	  
between	  people	  that	  makes	  their	  rela)onship	  into	  a	  (good)	  friendship.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  there	  are	  
many	  different	  kinds	  of	  friendships	  marked	  (if	  harmonies	  are	  what	  makes	  for	  good	  friendships)	  
by	  different	  kinds	  of	  harmonies.	  Further	  kinds	  of	  harmonies	  may	  make	  plays	  good,	  may	  make	  
socie)es	  good,	  may	  make	  the	  rela)onships	  among	  states	  good,	  etc.	  Perhaps	  what	  is	  common	  
to	  all	  of	  them	  is	  that	  they	  are	  all	  instances	  of	  the	  formal	  no)on	  of	  harmony,	  but	  that	  is	  
uninforma)ve	  about	  what	  exactly	  makes	  them	  good.	  And	  unfortunately	  Finnis	  does	  not	  
inves)gate	  the	  different	  substan)ve	  rela)onships	  that	  he	  implicitly	  invokes.
This	  omission	  means	  that	  we	  do	  not	  know	  what	  are	  the	  basic	  goods	  in	  Finnis’s	  view.	  They	  are	  
friendships	  when	  they	  are	  good	  friendships,	  religions	  that	  are	  good	  religions,	  and	  so	  on	  –	  but	  
when	  are	  they	  good	  we	  are	  not	  told.	  That	  has	  the	  addi)onal	  consequence	  of	  making	  it	  
impossible	  to	  examine	  whether	  they	  are	  basic	  goods,	  and	  also	  impossible	  to	  examine	  whether	  
harmony	  plays	  the	  role	  in	  making	  them	  good	  that	  Finnis	  claims.	  That	  last	  point	  may	  be	  
important.	  I	  think,	  for	  example,	  that	  I	  live	  in	  harmony	  with	  many	  people,	  including	  many	  of	  
whose	  existence	  I	  am	  unaware,	  who	  are	  not	  my	  friends.	  I	  also	  feel	  that	  there	  is	  much	  more	  to	  
friendship	  than	  harmony,	  much	  more	  that	  makes	  friendships	  good	  as	  friendships	  than	  the	  
harmony	  between	  the	  friends.	  But	  to	  find	  out	  in	  what	  ways	  I	  am	  wrong	  we	  need	  substan)ve	  
accounts	  of	  the	  different	  harmonious	  rela)onships	  various	  goods	  embody.
	  The	  advantage	  of	  the	  case	  of	  knowledge	  is	  that	  its	  examina)on	  can	  avoid	  these	  issues.	  I	  turn	  
to	  Finnis’s	  use	  of	  it	  in	  my	  a:empt	  to	  clarify	  my	  own	  mind	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  values.
3. The	  place	  of	  self-­‐evidence
A	  ques)on	  that	  seems	  to	  me	  fundamental	  is	  what	  makes	  knowledge	  valuable?	  I	  suspect	  that	  
Finnis	  took	  himself	  to	  have	  dealt	  with	  this	  ques)on	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  the	  self-­‐evidence	  of	  
basic	  values.	  But	  I	  believe	  that	  that	  issue	  does	  not	  touch	  my	  ques)on.	  There	  are	  two	  ma:ers	  
that	  may	  be	  self-­‐evident	  (and	  I	  express	  no	  view	  whether	  either	  is):	  it	  may	  be	  self-­‐evident	  
whether	  something,	  say	  knowledge,	  is	  valuable.	  It	  may	  also	  be	  self-­‐evident	  what	  makes	  
knowledge	  valuable.	  My	  ques)on	  (‘what	  makes	  knowledge	  valuable?’)	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  
the	  doubts	  about	  the	  value	  of	  knowledge.	  It	  seeks	  an	  explana)on	  of	  its	  value	  (if	  it	  has	  one),	  an	  
explana)on	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  it	  has	  value.	  The	  claim	  that	  that	  too	  is	  self-­‐evident	  is	  (if	  true)	  
reassuring.	  But	  it	  does	  not	  actually	  give	  us	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  ques)on.	  It	  is	  good	  to	  know	  that	  
the	  answer	  is	  self-­‐evident,	  but	  we	  also	  want	  to	  know	  what	  it	  is.
It	  is	  no	  use	  saying	  that	  because	  the	  answer	  is	  self-­‐evident	  we	  already	  know	  it.	  Finnis	  rightly	  
alerts	  us	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  not	  everyone	  knows	  all	  the	  self-­‐evident	  truths.	  And	  he	  provides	  a	  
personal	  example	  of	  this	  fact:	  as	  we	  know,	  he	  himself	  has	  changed	  his	  mind	  on	  the	  list	  of	  the	  
basic	  goods,	  even	  though	  that	  these	  are	  the	  basic	  goods	  is	  (according	  to	  him)	  self-­‐evident.	  But	  
be	  that	  as	  it	  may,	  we	  need	  not	  assume	  that	  the	  ques)on	  (what	  makes	  knowledge	  valuable)	  is	  
posed	  by	  someone	  who	  does	  not	  know	  the	  answer.	  It	  is	  simply	  a	  request	  for	  the	  answer	  to	  be	  
ar)culated.	  (Think	  of	  it	  by	  analogy	  to	  an	  exam	  ques)on.)	  But	  is	  there	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  
ques)on	  ‘what	  makes	  knowledge	  valuable?’	  And	  if	  there	  is,	  must	  it	  be	  possible	  to	  express	  the	  
answer	  in	  words?	  
Some	  may	  suspect	  that	  the	  ques)on	  has	  no	  answer.	  An	  answer	  to	  the	  ques)on	  what	  makes	  A	  
good	  could	  only	  refer	  to	  some	  other	  good,	  B,	  and	  state	  that	  A	  is	  good	  because	  it	  is	  B.	  Such	  
explana)ons	  are	  frequently	  available	  and	  helpful,	  but	  their	  availability	  depends	  on	  A	  being	  a	  
deriva)ve	  good,	  something	  whose	  goodness	  derives	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  B.	  Basic	  goods	  
cannot	  be	  explained	  in	  that	  way.	  They	  are	  basic,	  not	  deriva)ve.	  But	  while	  it	  is	  true	  that	  basic	  
goods	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  other	  goods,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  they	  can	  be	  explained,	  meaning	  that	  
what	  makes	  each	  one	  of	  them	  the	  good	  it	  is	  can	  be	  explained.	  These	  explana)ons,	  if	  available,	  
will	  be	  circular	  in	  that	  they	  will	  explain	  evalua)ve	  concepts	  using	  evalua)ve	  concepts.	  We	  
know	  that	  the	  fundamental	  concepts	  all	  thought	  relies	  on	  cannot	  be	  explained	  in	  a	  non-­‐circular	  
way,	  but	  some	  wide	  circles	  have	  explanatory	  power.
Finnis	  underlines	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  values	  and	  reasons.	  Does	  that	  commit	  him	  to	  the	  
possibility	  of	  explaining	  what	  it	  is	  about	  any	  value	  that	  makes	  it	  a	  value?	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  he	  
explains	  what	  makes	  knowledge	  a	  value.	  So	  perhaps	  he	  thinks	  there	  is	  no	  answer	  to	  the	  
ques)on.	  He	  may	  be	  thinking	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  value	  of	  knowledge	  is	  self-­‐evident	  makes	  it	  
intelligible	  without	  there	  being	  an	  explana)on	  in	  language	  of	  what	  makes	  it	  a	  value.	  This	  is	  not	  
a	  view	  shared	  by	  everyone	  who	  believes	  that	  some	  of	  our	  knowledge	  is	  self-­‐evident.	  An	  
alterna)ve	  view	  is	  that	  one	  can	  acquire	  knowledge	  that	  P	  by	  coming	  to	  realise	  that	  P	  is	  self-­‐
evident	  only	  if	  one	  can	  understand	  P.	  We	  can	  have	  knowledge	  without	  understanding	  what	  we	  
know.	  Some	  objects	  of	  knowledge	  may	  not	  be	  possible	  objects	  of	  understanding.	  For	  example,	  
possibly	  that	  green	  is	  the	  colour	  of	  grass	  is	  not	  something	  we	  can	  understand.	  Those	  who	  have	  
the	  concept	  “green”	  know	  some	  such	  truths,	  for	  the	  normal	  way	  of	  having	  the	  concept	  is	  to	  be	  
able	  to	  iden)fy	  green	  objects	  by	  looking	  at	  them.	  Blind	  or	  colour-blind	  people	  can	  have	  the	  
concept	  without	  having	  that	  ability,	  but	  their	  knowledge	  of	  the	  colour	  of	  things	  is	  parasi)c	  on	  
others	  having	  it	  in	  the	  normal	  way:	  they	  know	  that	  among	  green	  things	  are	  those	  that	  sighted	  
people	  can	  recognise	  as	  green	  by	  looking	  at	  them.	  However,	  “knowledge”	  and	  the	  concepts	  of	  
other	  basic	  values	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  concepts	  whose	  applica)on	  can	  be	  recognised	  
perceptually.	  At	  least	  they	  are	  not	  concepts	  whose	  applica)on	  is	  primarily	  by	  perceptual	  
recogni)on.	  There	  may	  be	  other	  truths	  whose	  understanding	  is	  not	  a	  possibility.	  But	  I	  agree	  
with	  Finnis	  in	  his	  insistence	  on	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  value,	  and	  that	  seems	  to	  imply	  that	  it	  is	  
possible	  not	  only	  to	  know	  that	  something	  is	  a	  value	  but	  also	  to	  understand	  what	  it	  is	  that	  
makes	  it	  a	  value.	  It	  is	  of	  course	  possible	  to	  know	  without	  understanding	  that	  something	  is	  of	  
value.	  But	  that	  knowledge	  presupposes	  the	  possibility	  of	  understanding.
Why	  must	  value	  be	  intelligible?	  A	  more	  subtle	  argument	  is	  called	  for,	  but	  briefly,	  it	  seems	  
plausible	  that	  the	  primary	  way	  of	  iden)fying	  what	  has	  value	  is	  by	  poin)ng	  to	  features	  that	  
make	  it	  valuable,	  features	  relevant	  to	  an	  explana)on	  of	  what	  makes	  the	  valuable	  object	  
valuable.	  The	  primary	  way	  of	  iden)fying	  that	  something	  is	  of	  value	  is	  that	  it	  has	  features	  or	  
rela)ons	  that	  make	  it	  valuable,	  features	  and	  rela)ons	  that	  we	  can	  understand.	  It	  cannot	  be	  
iden)fied	  by	  possession	  of	  features	  that	  are	  irrelevant	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  what	  makes	  it	  
valuable.	  Compare	  explaining	  why	  rudeness	  is	  bad	  by	  the	  fact	  (let’s	  assume	  that	  it	  is	  a	  fact)	  
that	  it	  increases	  the	  addressees’	  body	  temperature	  with	  an	  explana)on	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  hur)ng	  
the	  addressees’	  feelings	  and	  impeding	  friendly	  interac)ons	  with	  them.	  The	  first	  cannot	  
possibly	  be	  a	  way	  of	  iden)fying	  what	  conduct	  is	  rude,	  or	  that	  rudeness	  is	  bad,	  unless	  one	  was	  
reliably	  informed	  of	  the	  connec)on	  between	  rudeness	  and	  body	  temperature	  by	  someone	  
(possibly	  oneself)	  who	  could	  establish	  its	  existence	  because	  he	  is	  able	  to	  iden)fy	  rudeness	  and	  
its	  character	  in	  the	  primary	  way,	  the	  way	  that	  contributes	  to	  an	  explana)on	  of	  what	  makes	  it	  
bad.
I	  should	  underline	  that	  I	  assume	  neither	  that	  there	  is	  one	  privileged	  explana)on	  (there	  are	  
many	  and	  different	  ones	  that	  would	  be	  appropriate	  in	  different	  contexts),	  nor	  that	  anyone	  who	  
knows	  of	  the	  value	  of	  something	  understands	  what	  makes	  it	  valuable	  (there	  are	  secondary,	  
deriva)ve	  ways	  of	  iden)fying	  what	  is	  of	  value).	  A	  more	  difficult	  ques)on	  is	  whether	  (as	  I	  have	  
been	  assuming	  in	  this	  descrip)on	  of	  the	  case	  for	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  value)	  the	  understanding	  
of	  what	  makes	  anything	  of	  value	  valuable	  assumes	  the	  ability	  to	  explain	  that	  in	  language.	  AYer	  
all	  we	  learn	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  different	  values	  not	  so	  much	  by	  explicit	  defini)on	  and	  instruc)on	  
(though	  they	  can	  help)	  as	  by	  developing	  through	  experience	  and	  reflec)on,	  observa)on	  and	  
imita)on,	  a	  sense	  of	  what	  they	  are.	  Arguably,	  no	  complete	  understanding	  of	  basic	  values	  can	  
be	  acquired	  by	  defini)on,	  however	  complex,	  alone.
These	  observa)ons,	  however,	  while	  sugges)ng	  that	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  ques)on	  what	  makes	  
knowledge	  good	  cannot	  take	  the	  typical	  form	  of	  a	  defini)on,	  do	  not	  in	  the	  least	  suggest	  that	  
the	  answer	  is	  ineffable,	  and	  that	  no	  explana)on(s)	  in	  language	  would	  do.	  It	  may	  be	  true,	  for	  
example,	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  teach	  someone	  what	  our	  values	  are	  (what	  we	  take	  to	  be	  of	  
value)	  is	  to	  have	  them	  live	  with	  us	  and	  observe,	  yet	  surely	  we	  can	  also	  tell	  them	  in	  words	  what	  
those	  values	  are.	  And	  we	  can	  do	  so	  in	  a	  way	  that	  enables	  the	  learner	  to	  apply	  the	  newly	  
acquired	  concepts	  to	  new	  instances,	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  contexts,	  and	  that	  requires	  some	  
understanding	  of	  the	  concept.	  So,	  experience	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  explain	  what	  makes	  
something	  of	  value	  valuable,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  give	  a	  comprehensive	  explana)on	  on	  
any	  single	  occasion.	  
Why	  am	  I	  belabouring	  these	  points?	  Because	  Finnis’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  self-­‐evident	  character	  
of	  the	  value	  of	  knowledge	  raised	  in	  my	  mind	  not	  (or	  not	  only)	  the	  ques)on	  whether	  self-­‐
evidence	  plays	  a	  role,	  but	  a	  desire	  to	  understand	  the	  role	  it	  plays:	  its	  significance	  and	  func)on.	  
Self-­‐evidence	  is	  oYen	  invoked	  to	  rebut	  scep)cism.	  I	  think	  that	  at	  best	  it	  has	  only	  a	  small	  role	  in	  
that	  drama.	  Scep)cism,	  when	  serious,	  is	  not	  a	  brute	  doub)ng,	  or	  disinclina)on	  to	  believe.	  It	  is	  
rooted	  in	  sophis)cated	  arguments	  about	  various	  impossibili)es:	  the	  so-­‐called	  metaphysical	  
impossibility	  of	  things	  like	  values,	  or	  proper)es	  like	  having	  value,	  exis)ng,	  or	  rather	  being	  part	  
of	  the	  fundamental	  furniture	  of	  the	  world,	  arguments	  about	  the	  impossibility	  of	  knowing	  what	  
they	  are,	  given	  the	  ways	  knowledge	  can	  be	  acquired,	  and	  so	  on.	  Explana)on	  and	  refuta)on,	  not	  
self-­‐evidence,	  assure	  us	  against	  scep)cism.	  My	  preceding	  comments	  aimed	  to	  suggest	  that	  
self-­‐evidence	  as	  a	  source	  of	  knowledge	  or	  as	  a	  fundamental	  jus)fying	  condi)on	  does	  not	  
provide	  an	  understanding	  of	  value.	  Rather	  it	  presupposes	  such	  an	  understanding.	  Following	  
Descartes	  we	  should	  say	  that	  certainty	  can	  be	  reached	  when	  contempla)ng	  a	  clear	  and	  dis)nct	  
idea,	  or	  proposi)on.	  So	  we	  need	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  ques)on	  what	  makes	  knowledge	  a	  good	  
before	  we	  can	  trust	  any	  sense	  of	  certainty,	  or	  feelings	  of	  self-­‐evidence	  that	  knowledge	  is	  a	  
good.	  Self-­‐evidence	  plays	  a	  role,	  if	  at	  all,	  only	  aYer	  all	  the	  hard	  work	  is	  done.	  
4. Various	  reasons	  for	  a	  single	  value?
When	  presen)ng	  knowledge	  as	  his	  central	  case	  of	  a	  basic	  value,	  Finnis	  explains	  that	  he	  
considers	  only	  the	  non-­‐instrumental	  value	  of	  knowledge	  (NLNR	  59),	  and	  that	  he	  considers	  all	  
knowledge	  as	  valuable	  in	  itself,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  there	  is	  (non-­‐instrumental)	  value	  in	  seeking,	  
and	  in	  achieving,	  knowledge	  of	  any	  proposi)on.	  (NLNR	  60).	  Instrumental	  value	  and	  
instrumental	  reasons	  used	  to	  be	  taken	  as	  rela)vely	  simple	  and	  unproblema)c	  kinds	  of	  value	  
and	  reasons.	  But	  recent	  wri)ngs	  have	  shown	  it	  to	  be	  otherwise.	  I	  have	  wri:en	  at	  length	  on	  the	  
subject	  and	  will	  here	  understand	  the	  ‘instrumental’	  to	  be	  the	  ‘facilita)ve’	  namely	  preparatory,	  
facilita)ve	  or	  causally	  efficient	  steps	  towards	  something	  one	  has	  an	  undefeated	  reason	  to	  
pursue,	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  among	  one’s	  goals.	  So	  understood	  knowledge	  can	  have	  
instrumental	  or	  facilita)ng	  value,	  though	  (a)	  not	  all	  knowledge	  has	  it,	  and	  (b)	  that	  value	  is	  
derived.	  The	  case	  Finnis	  presents	  is	  for	  the	  basic	  value	  of	  knowledge.
Finnis	  tells	  us	  that	  ‘to	  think	  of	  knowledge	  as	  a	  value	  is	  not	  to	  think	  that	  every	  true	  proposi)on	  
is	  equally	  worth	  knowing’	  (NRNL	  62).	  This	  last	  claim	  deserves	  scru)ny.	  I	  take	  it	  to	  mean	  that	  
different	  instances	  of	  knowledge	  may	  have	  different	  value	  and	  that	  there	  may	  be	  reasons	  of	  
different	  strength	  to	  acquire	  knowledge	  of	  different	  items	  of	  knowledge.	  Obviously,	  there	  may	  
be	  value	  in	  knowing	  some	  truths	  that	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  or	  derive	  from	  the	  value	  of	  
knowledge,	  and	  that	  may	  make	  knowing	  them	  more	  valuable	  than	  knowing	  others.	  For	  
example,	  knowledge	  of	  some	  moral	  truths	  may	  be	  part	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  a	  moral	  person.	  That	  
may	  make	  knowledge	  of	  those	  truths	  more	  valuable,	  more	  important,	  than	  knowledge	  of	  some	  
other	  truths.	  That	  may	  be	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  having	  that	  knowledge	  is	  valuable	  as	  an	  
instan)a)on	  of	  two	  dis)nct	  values	  (with	  apologies	  for	  the	  awkward	  way	  I	  put	  the	  point).	  But	  it	  
may	  appear	  that	  all	  instances	  of	  one	  value	  would	  be	  of	  equal	  importance,	  and	  that	  one	  value	  
would	  generate	  one	  reason,	  a	  reason	  of	  the	  same	  strength	  wherever	  it	  applies.	  AYer	  all	  if	  the	  
value	  provides	  the	  reason	  and	  the	  value	  is	  the	  same	  how	  can	  the	  reason	  vary	  in	  any	  respect,	  
including	  in	  its	  strength?	  How	  can	  knowledge	  of	  different	  proposi)ons	  differ	  in	  how	  valuable	  it	  
is	  qua	  knowledge?	  
One	  way	  it	  can	  be	  so	  is	  where	  the	  value	  in	  ques)on	  can	  be	  realised	  to	  different	  degrees:	  Some	  
pain)ngs	  may	  be	  of	  greater	  ar)s)c	  merit	  than	  others.	  They	  are	  all	  valuable	  because	  of	  their	  
ar)s)c	  merit,	  but	  they	  have	  that	  value	  in	  different	  degrees.	  Various	  experiences	  may	  be	  
valuable	  because	  they	  are	  enjoyable,	  but	  they	  may	  be	  enjoyable	  to	  various	  degrees.	  Possibly	  at	  
least	  some	  pain)ngs	  and	  some	  experiences	  are	  of	  different	  degrees	  of	  value	  because	  even	  
though	  they	  all	  realise	  but	  one	  value	  they	  realise	  it	  to	  various	  degrees.	  The	  possibility	  that	  a	  
single	  value	  property	  can	  be	  realised	  to	  various	  degrees	  is	  problema)c	  and	  requires	  analysis.	  
But	  we	  can	  sidestep	  this	  ma:er	  here,	  since	  knowledge	  does	  not	  admit	  of	  degrees.	  So	  if	  
knowing	  that	  P	  is	  more	  valuable	  than	  knowing	  that	  Q,	  this	  is	  not	  because	  there	  is	  a	  higher	  
degree	  of	  knowledge	  in	  knowing	  that	  P	  than	  in	  knowing	  that	  Q.	  The	  difference,	  it	  would	  seem,	  
is	  not	  in	  the	  knowing	  but	  in	  the	  known.	  But	  that	  difference	  cannot	  affect	  how	  valuable	  knowing	  
that	  item	  is	  qua	  knowledge.
But	  perhaps	  this	  is	  too	  quick.	  Perhaps	  the	  value	  of	  knowledge	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  generic	  value,	  and	  
there	  are	  various	  specific	  values	  subsumed	  under	  it.	  Take	  as	  an	  example	  a	  possible	  difference	  
in	  value	  between	  knowledge	  of	  eclipses	  and	  knowledge	  of	  the	  French	  Revolu)on.	  If	  there	  is	  a	  
difference	  in	  the	  value	  of	  these	  species	  of	  knowledge	  it	  cannot	  be	  in	  their	  object.	  It	  cannot	  be	  
that	  knowing	  about	  eclipses	  is	  more	  (or	  less)	  valuable	  than	  knowing	  what	  happened,	  and	  why,	  
during	  the	  French	  Revolu)on	  because	  somehow	  the	  laws	  of	  nature	  are	  more	  valuable	  than	  the	  
events	  of	  the	  revolu)on.	  This	  does	  not	  even	  make	  sense.	  Nor	  can	  it	  be	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
different	  types	  of	  knowledge	  have	  different	  func)ons	  in	  the	  life	  of	  different	  people:	  arguably	  it	  
is	  more	  important	  (more	  valuable?)	  for	  historians	  to	  know	  history	  than	  to	  know	  science.	  That	  is	  
due	  to	  the	  role	  knowledge	  of	  this	  or	  that	  has	  in	  their	  lives.	  It	  marks	  a	  difference	  not	  in	  the	  value	  
of	  scien)fic	  v.	  historical	  knowledge	  as	  such,	  but	  in	  their	  value	  to	  this	  person	  or	  that.	  Finnis	  
men)ons	  separately	  the	  possibility	  of	  varying	  degrees	  in	  value	  that	  different	  areas	  of	  
knowledge	  have	  for	  one	  person	  or	  another.	  The	  varia)ons	  in	  value	  I	  am	  trying	  to	  understand	  
are	  varia)ons	  in	  the	  value	  of	  knowledge,	  not	  in	  its	  value	  for	  X	  or	  Y.
Arguably	  there	  is	  another	  difference	  between	  scien)fic	  and	  historical	  knowledge.	  The	  first	  but	  
not	  the	  second	  presupposes	  a	  reasonably	  high	  level	  of	  competence	  in	  mathema)cs.	  The	  
second	  but	  not	  the	  first	  engages	  the	  empathy	  of	  those	  who	  possess	  the	  knowledge.	  Do	  we	  not	  
have	  here	  at	  least	  the	  possibility	  that	  different	  kinds	  of	  knowledge	  while	  being	  the	  same	  in	  
being	  knowledge	  vary	  in	  value	  because	  they	  require	  different	  mental	  capaci)es?	  It	  is	  common	  
to	  think	  that	  the	  possession	  of,	  and	  some	  of	  the	  uses	  of	  many	  of	  our	  capaci)es	  are	  intrinsically	  
valuable.	  Possibly	  when	  people	  assign	  different	  value	  to	  different	  types	  of	  knowledge	  they	  are	  
influenced	  by	  awareness	  of	  the	  different	  abili)es	  they	  require.	  Note	  that	  such	  views	  cannot	  
underpin	  the	  claim	  that	  knowledge	  is	  valuable	  in	  itself.	  These	  abili)es	  exist	  independently	  of	  
their	  role	  in	  securing	  knowledge,	  or	  some	  types	  of	  knowledge,	  and	  they	  can	  be	  manifested	  in	  
other	  contexts	  too.	  Admi:edly,	  some	  kinds	  of	  knowledge	  are	  occasions	  for	  the	  display	  or	  use	  of	  
those	  abili)es.	  However,	  not	  all	  uses	  of	  valuable	  abili)es	  have	  any	  value	  at	  all	  (some	  murders	  
involve	  impressive	  use	  of	  important	  abili)es).	  The	  use	  of	  empathy	  or	  other	  abili)es	  in	  some	  
knowledge	  is	  valuable	  only	  if	  that	  knowledge	  is	  otherwise	  valuable.	  True,	  if	  knowledge	  is	  
valuable	  in	  itself	  then,	  other	  things	  being	  equal,	  knowledge	  that	  involves	  empathy	  may	  be	  (by	  
that	  fact)	  made	  be:er	  than	  knowledge	  that	  does	  not.	  
But	  generally	  speaking	  that	  would	  be	  only	  marginally	  relevant.	  We	  do	  not	  normally	  think	  that	  
knowledge	  is	  admirable	  as	  a	  display	  of	  mental	  powers	  and	  abili)es.	  We	  see	  that	  most	  clearly	  
when	  considering	  cases	  where	  we	  do	  admire	  people	  for	  having	  the	  ability	  to	  get	  to	  know	  
something:	  ‘Jim	  is	  so	  clever’,	  we	  may	  say,	  ‘star)ng	  from	  scratch	  he	  got	  on	  top	  of	  quantum	  
mechanics	  in	  less	  than	  a	  week’.	  True,	  but	  normally	  when	  we	  find	  knowledge	  valuable	  
considera)ons	  of	  this	  kind	  are	  far	  from	  our	  thoughts.	  To	  conclude,	  the	  engagement	  of	  different	  
abili)es	  in	  different	  cases	  of	  knowledge	  can	  make	  some	  of	  them	  marginally	  of	  greater	  value	  
than	  others,	  but	  (a)	  only	  if	  the	  knowledge	  in	  which	  the	  abili)es	  are	  engaged	  is	  independently	  
valuable	  and	  (b)	  it	  cannot	  explain	  the	  familiar	  view	  that	  knowledge	  of	  history	  is	  more	  
important	  than	  knowledge	  of	  local	  gossip	  and	  like	  opinions.
Another	  possibility	  to	  consider	  is	  that	  knowledge	  of	  different	  areas,	  or	  different	  kinds	  of	  
knowledge	  may	  be	  cons)tuent	  elements	  of	  different	  more	  complex	  values.	  This	  seems	  highly	  
likely.	  A	  variety	  of	  valuable	  occupa)ons,	  pas)mes,	  styles	  of	  life	  and	  the	  like	  require	  a	  degree	  of	  
mastery	  of	  knowledge	  of	  various	  areas	  (think	  of	  a	  clinical	  psychologist,	  a	  stock	  broker,	  a	  youth	  
guide,	  a	  hang	  glider	  or	  just	  about	  anything).	  This	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  reasons	  one	  has	  to	  pursue	  
knowledge	  in	  any	  par)cular	  area	  unless	  one	  pursues	  the	  form	  of	  ac)vity	  of	  which	  it	  is	  a	  
component.	  Arguably,	  however,	  knowledge	  of	  some	  subjects	  or	  areas	  is	  part	  of	  the	  ideal	  of	  a	  
good	  human	  life.	  That	  would	  provide	  everyone	  with	  reason	  to	  pursue	  such	  knowledge,	  and	  
arguably,	  other	  things	  being	  equal,	  knowledge	  of	  these	  ma:ers	  is	  of	  greater	  importance	  than	  
knowledge	  of	  other	  areas.	  Possibly	  it	  is	  more	  valuable	  because	  other	  knowledge	  in	  itself	  has	  no	  
value.	  AYer	  all,	  knowledge	  that	  is	  part	  of	  the	  ideal	  of	  a	  good	  life	  would	  be	  valuable	  even	  if	  
knowledge	  is	  not	  valuable	  in	  itself.	  If	  it	  is	  not	  then	  the	  argument	  for	  the	  superior	  value	  of	  that	  
knowledge	  does	  not	  show	  that	  some	  cases	  of	  knowledge	  can	  have	  different	  value	  as	  
knowledge.
5. Is	  Knowledge	  valuable?
Knowledge	  that	  is	  part	  of	  an	  ideal	  of	  a	  good	  human	  life	  would	  be	  valuable	  as	  part	  of	  that	  ideal	  
even	  if	  knowledge	  is	  not	  valuable	  in	  itself.	  It	  could	  be	  that	  knowledge	  that	  is	  a	  cons)tuent	  part	  
of	  the	  good	  life	  is	  valuable	  not	  merely	  as	  a	  component	  of	  the	  good	  life,	  but	  also	  in	  itself.	  Think	  
of	  an	  example:	  assume	  that	  knowledge	  of	  what	  makes	  life	  good	  is	  part	  of	  the	  ideal	  of	  a	  good	  
life.	  It	  seems	  reasonable	  that	  it	  is	  part	  of	  the	  good	  life	  because	  it	  is	  good	  in	  itself,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  
good	  in	  itself	  not	  because	  it	  is	  knowledge,	  but	  because	  it	  is	  knowledge-­‐of-­‐this-­‐ma:er.	  Having	  
this	  knowledge	  cons)tutes	  an	  orienta)on	  towards	  the	  world	  and	  life	  in	  it.	  It	  is	  not	  mere	  
theore)cal	  knowledge.	  But	  some	  kinds	  of	  purely	  theore)cal	  knowledge	  may	  be	  intrinsically	  
valuable,	  on	  analogous	  grounds.	  For	  example,	  knowing	  how	  things	  work	  where	  one	  is	  in	  the	  
world,	  and	  I	  mean	  both	  having	  the	  knowledge	  that	  enables	  one	  to	  understand	  people	  and	  other	  
animals,	  their	  conduct	  and	  social	  processes,	  and	  having	  the	  technical	  knowledge	  that	  enables	  
one	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  machines	  and	  tools	  one	  uses	  and	  those	  that	  service	  one’s	  needs	  
work,	  having	  that	  knowledge	  also	  affects,	  meaning	  cons)tutes	  part	  of,	  one’s	  mode	  of	  being	  in	  
the	  world,	  one’s	  orienta)on	  to	  oneself,	  other	  people	  and	  the	  environment	  one	  lives	  in.	  
Could	  it	  be	  that	  when	  knowledge	  is	  valuable	  in	  itself	  what	  makes	  it	  valuable	  are	  factors	  of	  
these	  kinds?	  There	  may	  also	  be	  other	  features	  that	  make	  some	  knowledge	  valuable.	  Perhaps	  
some	  knowledge	  is	  forma)ve	  of	  ways	  of	  rela)ng	  to	  the	  world,	  of	  living	  in	  the	  world.	  Some	  
knowledge	  may	  be	  valuable	  because	  it	  opens	  valuable	  opportuni)es	  for	  those	  who	  have	  it.	  And	  
there	  is	  of	  course	  knowledge	  that	  is	  good	  for	  this	  person	  or	  that	  because	  of	  its	  role	  in	  their	  life,	  
and	  there	  is	  always	  the	  important	  facilita)ve	  value	  that	  so	  much	  knowledge	  has.	  
So,	  being	  part	  of	  a	  valuable	  orienta)on	  towards	  oneself	  and	  the	  world	  makes	  some	  knowledge	  
valuable.	  Being	  part	  of	  op)ons	  for	  various	  ac)vi)es	  and	  pursuits	  may	  make	  some	  (possibly	  
different	  areas	  of)	  knowledge	  valuable,	  and	  some	  knowledge	  may	  be	  valuable	  for	  one	  person	  
or	  another,	  because	  of	  its	  rela)ons	  to	  their	  chosen	  rela)onships	  and	  pursuits.	  As	  these	  diverse	  
grounds	  do	  not	  all	  apply	  to	  the	  same	  kinds	  of,	  or	  domains	  of	  knowledge	  their	  existence	  does	  
not	  contribute	  to	  a	  case	  for	  thinking	  that	  knowledge	  is	  good	  in	  itself.	  Moreover,	  all	  of	  this	  
leaves	  much	  knowledge	  without	  value	  at	  all.	  Some	  cats	  were	  born	  on	  20	  November	  720	  A.D.	  
But	  is	  there	  any	  value	  at	  all	  in	  knowing	  how	  many?	  There	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  indefinite	  number	  
of	  truths	  knowledge	  of	  which	  is	  without	  value,	  and	  which	  moreover,	  are	  not	  objects	  of	  human	  
curiosity.	  If	  Finnis	  is	  right	  then	  there	  is	  some	  value	  in	  having	  such	  knowledge.	  But	  not	  knowing	  
what,	  in	  his	  view,	  makes	  knowledge	  valuable	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  assess	  his	  view.
	  
